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1 Introduction 
Numerous studies have confirmed both the goals of the current task and emotion, such 
as personal salience, can affect the allocation of attention (Shapiro et al., 1997). 
Moreover, the interaction between cognition and emotion has been the focus of 
experimental investigation from various perspectives. For example, an ERP study 
performed by (Flaisch et al., 2007) and a psychophysiological experiment performed 
by (Phelps et al., 2006) both confirm that emotion affects not only the processing of 
the current stimulus, but also the following stimuli. In this respect, Barnard et al 
(2005) have presented a literature review on the (somewhat “mixed”) results of 
attentional capture by emotional salience. They argue that examining the time course 
of emotional capture of attention is important to understand the effect of emotion and 
its interaction with other goal directed cognitive processing. Moreover, they also point 
out that the state of anxiety has a dramatic influence on the attentional deployment to 
threat related stimuli (Barnard et al., 2005). Such an influence of anxiety is also 
observed by others (e.g. Bishop et al., 2004; Koster et al., 2006). Based on this idea, 
we argue that detailed theories or computational models, which address the 
information processing in emotion, are critical to understand these mixed 
experimental findings and complex clinical observations. This is because the timing 
of each processing stage is made explicit in such models. 
 A recent empirical study (Barnard et al., 2005) suggests that threat related 
material may attract attention at different points in time compared to non-threat 
related stimuli, and the time course is modulated by both state anxiety and semantic 
similarity (between key-distractors and targets). In particular, they have discovered 
that emotional processing may shift the blink curve laterally in the AB experiment. In 
addition, other researchers have also observed similar effects of anxiety on the time 
course of attentional redirection. For example, (Georgiou et al., 2005; Fox et al., 
2001; Yiend and Mathews, 2001) have reported that anxiety has the effect of a 
delayed disengagement of visual attention away from threatening stimuli. Bishop et al 
(2004) have shown an interaction between anxiety state and attentional focus on 
threatening stimuli. Moreover, (Leyman et al., 2006) has reported that patients with 
major depressive disorders show stronger attention to angry faces when compared to 
controls. 
 Our modelling is focused on reproducing the timing effect reflected in lateral 
shifts of the blink curve due to changes in semantic similarity and state anxiety in the 
presence of threat-related material. In this report, we show how to extend the 
previously published model (Su et al. 2007), which models the effect of semantic 
modulation in Barnard’s key-distractor AB task (Barnard et al., 2004), to reproduce 
the emotional modulation reported by (Barnard et al., 2005). In the previous model, 
the main factor was the semantic salience of key-distractors, which changes the depth 
of the blink. However, in this model, we also need to consider emotion related factors, 
e.g. state anxiety. Moreover, body-state may also contribute to producing such an 
effect. So, the model is extended with the body-state subsystem (Barnard, 1985). 
 The report is organized as follows. We will firstly propose the basic principles 
underlying the model: processing of multiple streams and serial allocation of attention 
and two-staged processing of semantic meaning. Then, we will explain how threat is 
modelled. We also highlight three cognitive biases in anxiety: hyperactive Implic-
body loop, slow disengagement from threat, and selective processing in anxiety. 
Before we show the simulation results, we will also discuss how salience could 
modulate the speed of salience assignment. Finally, we show two experiments. The 
first one stresses how emotion competes with the main cognitive task when both task 
relevant and task irrelevant emotional representations occur at the same time. The 
second one demonstrates how such competition becomes complicated when multiple 
streams compete in real-time. 
2 Basic Principles of the Model 
2.1 Multiple Processing Streams  
In our previous model (Su et al., 2007), a pipeline structure was implemented using 
delay-lines, and was used to model sequential tasks, such as RSVP tasks. This model 
extends such a simple pipeline structure with additional components and feedback 
loops. As shown in Figure 1, the additional body-state subsystem encodes features 
from internal bodily receptors, such as cutaneous pressure, temperature, olfaction, 
muscle tension, pain, positions of parts of the body, tastes and smells (Barnard, 1985). 
SOM and VISC connect to the output of Implic. They are somatic and visceral 
response effectors respectively, which may change the body-state (Barnard, 1985). 
Another difference between this model and our previous model is that Prop does not 
only output to Sink, but also sends feedback to Implic. As a result, it can be seen that 
this model contains two loops, as shown in Figure 1:  
 
• The Implic-body loop starts from Implic, runs through SOM and VISC, then 
the body-state subsystem, and returns to Implic. Signals in this loop could be 
initiated by emotion-related inputs from source to Implic. The product of this 
loop is called bodily feedback.  
• The Implic-prop loop passes from Implic to Prop, and returns to Implic. The 
















Figure 1 Model of ICS central engine with body-state subsystem.  
 
 Similar to (Le Doux, 1996), Implic-body and Implic-prop loops in our model 
also work at different speeds. Our model is abstract in nature, so it cannot be directly 
mapped to Le Doux’s dual route. However, the Implic-prop loop is similar to Le 
Doux’s “high road” that receives emotional signals from the sensory thalamus, passes 
it to sensory cortex, and then sends it to the amygdala. We assume that the Implic-
prop loop is slow because it is evolutionarily more recent and requires high-level 
cognitive processing. More importantly, it has limited capacity because both Implic 
and Prop require the buffer to access semantic meaning, i.e. only one subsystem can 
access meaning at the same time. To some extent, the Implic-prop loop may also be 
characterised as a controlled process (Hasher and Zacks, 1979; Shiffrin and 
Schneider, 1977). The Implic-body loop is similar to Le Doux’s “low road” that 
transmits emotional signals directly from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala, 
which is believed by Le Doux to be the centre of emotional processing (Le Doux, 
1996). We assume that the Implic-body loop is fast because it is evolutionarily 
(relatively) ancient, and mainly requires low-level processing. In particular, the 
capacity of this process is not limited, in the sense that the body-state subsystem does 
not require the buffer to monitor the changes in the body. So, such processes may be 
characterised as automatic (Hasher and Zacks, 1979; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). 
We argued that propositional processing is relatively slow, since it needs to extract 
“definitive” referential meaning. This is reflected by the fact that the processing speed 
in Prop is slower on average and has more variance, thus it may potentially have long 
processing delays.  
Note, our model does not make explicit assumptions on how subsystems are 
mapped to brain areas. So, it should not be regarded as an implementation of Le 
Doux’s (1996) theory. In fact, subsystems in our model can only be related to such a 
neural network (Le Doux, 1996) in explaining the specific experimental findings 
discussed in this report. Another issue regarding Le Doux’s theory of emotional 
networks in the brain is that most evidence is derived from animal studies. Hence, 
whether or not such a theory is generalisable to humans is an open question. 
2.2 Serial Allocation of Attention 
The mechanism for attentional engagement in this model is similar to the model 
described in the previous model (Su et al., 2007). That is, it is only when attention is 
engaged at a subsystem that it can assess the salience of items passing through it. In 
the current model, there could be multiple input streams in a subsystem, for example 
Implic has three inputs: from the visual system, from the body-state subsystem and 
from Prop. We assume that it is only when attention is engaged at a particular stream 
of input within a subsystem that the information in that stream can be assessed for 
salience. Furthermore, we assume that attention can only be engaged at one subsystem 
and only at one stream of input at a time. Consequently, the system cannot access the 
salience of a stream while it is accessing the salience of another at the same time. We 
can see that these constraints are generalised from the previous model, and they will 
play an important role in generating blinks in this model. As in the previous model, 
when attention is engaged at a subsystem or a stream, we say that it is buffered 
(Barnard, 1999). Although items pass concurrently, i.e. all items throughout the 
system are moved on one place on each time step, the buffer mechanism ensures that 
central attentional resources are allocated serially. This is because salience assignment 
can only be performed if the appropriate stream of input within a subsystem is 
buffered, and only one stream can be buffered at a time.  
2.3 Two-stages 
A number of theoretical explanations and indeed computational models of the AB 
have been proposed; see (Bowman and Wyble, 2007) for a review. Like (Chun and 
Potter, 1995), we have argued elsewhere for a two-stage model (Barnard et al., 2004; 
Barnard and Bowman, 2004), but this time recast to focus exclusively on semantic 
analysis and executive processing. In particular, (Barnard and Bowman, 2004) 
modelled the key-distractor blink task using a two-stage model. In the context of 
modelling distributed control, we implemented the two-stage model as a dialogue 
between two levels of meaning. In the first stage, a generic level of semantic 
representation is monitored and initially used to determine if an incoming item is 
salient in the context of the specified task. If it is found to be so, then, in the second 
stage, the specific referential meaning of the word is subjected to detailed semantic 
scrutiny. In this stage a word’s meaning is actively evaluated in relation to the 
required referential properties of the target category. If this reveals a match, then the 
target is encoded for later report. The first of these stages is somewhat akin to first 
taking a “glance” at generic meaning, with the second akin to taking a closer “look” at 
the relationship between the meaning of the incoming item and the target category. 
These two stages are implemented in two distinct semantic subsystems proposed 
within a multi-level model for cognition and emotion: the implicational subsystem or 
Implic (which supports the first stage) and the propositional subsystem or Prop (which 
supports the second) (Barnard, 1999), as shown in Figure 1. Note, these two 
subsystems are components in the central engine of the ICS model (Barnard, 1999). 
 These two subsystems process qualitatively distinct types of meaning. One, 
implicational meaning, is holistic, abstract and schematic, and is where affect is 
represented and experienced (Barnard, 1999). The other is classically “rational”, 
being based upon propositional representation and captures referentially specific 
semantic properties and relationships. The exchanges between two levels of meaning 
reflect distributed executive functions rather than central executive 
control/homunculus. In the context of the task being considered here, these 
subsystems can be distinguished as follows: 
 
• Implicational Subsystem. This performs the broad “categorical” analysis of 
items, which might be related to Chun and Potter’s first stage of processing, 
by detecting the presence of targets according to their broad categorical 
features. In the context of this report, we will call the representations built at 
this subsystem implicational and we will talk in terms of implicationally 
salient items, i.e. those that “pass the implicational subsystem test”. The 
implicational subsystem implements the idea introduced earlier of a “glance”. 
• Propositional Subsystem. This builds upon the implicational representation 
generated from the glance in order to construct a full (propositional) 
identification of the item under consideration, which is sufficient to test 
whether the meaning of the incoming item meets the task specification and 
should therefore be reported. We will describe items that “pass the 
propositional test” as propositionally salient. That is, this more detailed level 
of semantics is required to test the specific referential meaning of an incoming 
item against the specification of the target category. 
 
 There is significant evidence that a good deal of human semantic processing 
relies upon propositionally impoverished representations. It is this evidence that gives 
the clearest justification for the existence of a distinct implicational level of meaning. 
In particular, semantic errors make clear that sometimes we only have (referentially 
non-specific) semantic gist information available to us, e.g. false memories (Roediger 
and McDermott, 1995) and the Noah illusion (Erickson and Mattson, 1981). With 
respect to the latter, when comprehending sentences, participants often miss a 
semantic inconsistency if it does not dramatically conflict with the gist of the 
sentence, e.g., in a Noah specific sentence, such as “How many animals of each kind 
did Moses take on the Ark?” most people respond “two” even though they know, 
when pressed, that it was Noah, not Moses, who took the animals on the Ark. 
Substitution of Moses for Noah often fails to be noticed, while substitution with 
Nixon, or even Adam, is noticed. This is presumably because both Moses and Noah 
fit the generic (implicational) schema “aged male biblical figure”, but Nixon and 
Adam do not. 
 In addition, Gaillard et al (2006) recently reported that in a subliminal priming 
study, semantic gist information was available even when participants failed to 
correctly name masked emotional words. Specifically, in error, words semantically 
related to target words were often reported (e.g. target “war”, response “danger”; 
target “bomb”, response “death”). This suggests the availability of implicational 
meaning and the absence of veridical propositional meaning. In addition, deep 
dyslexia (Coltheart et al, 1987), in which sufferers generate incorrect referents (e.g. 
reading “lion” as “tiger”), can be regarded as a marker of broadly intact extraction of 
implicational meaning and significantly impaired attribution of precise propositional 
meaning. 
 As outlined earlier, the implicational and propositional subsystems perform 
their corresponding salience assessments as items pass through them in the pipeline. 
We will talk in terms of the overall delay-line and subsystem delay-lines. The former 
of which describes the complete end-to-end pipeline, from the visual to the response 
subsystems, while the latter is used to describe the portion of the overall pipeline 
passing through a component subsystem, e.g. the propositional delay-line. 
3 Modelling Threat 
3.1 Levels of Threat-related Markers 
In ICS, Implic is the centre for emotional processing (Barnard, 1999), so it is the key 
to modelling emotional influences of attention. As previously explained, Implic may 
have three sources of threat-related markers (corresponding to the three input arrows 
to Implic in Figure 1), and they can be classified into two levels.  
 
1. The first one is external stimuli, e.g. the threat-related information passed from 
the visual system (Source) to Implic. We argue that such stimuli contain first 
order threat-related markers because they are directly extracted from sensory 
inputs. In general, animals have the ability to extract first order threatening 
information from the environment, and it has been argued that such ability is 
hard-wired through evolution. Such information acts as cues of potential 
danger, so it is important for almost all animals, including humans to survive 
in a changeable environment. Hence, threatening information needs to be 
rapidly extracted directly from sensory inputs. However, first order threat-
related markers are abstract and holistic compared to the second order markers 
that are generated from Prop. Taking Le Doux’s famous example, a rope that 
has the shape of a snake may be interpreted by Implic as a potential threat. 
However, typically it would not be interpreted by Prop as a potential threat.  
As the first order threat related markers could act as cues of potential 
danger, animals need to respond to these cues and prepare themselves to 
handle the potential danger. Whatever they choose, e.g. to escape or defend, it 
requires some sort of bodily change, as arise from a set of signals sent to the 
body via SOM and/or VISC. The results of these signals may be fear 
responses, such as increase in the heart rate, blood pressure and muscle tension 
or freezing behaviour, so the animal is ready to run or attack when the danger 
actually arrives. There is evidence that suggests threatening information could 
be extracted as early as Implic, consequently causing bodily responses. For 
example, Ohman et al (1994) have shown that, compared to normals, phobics 
have larger skin conductance responses to masked fear related pictures, such 
as snakes, even when they were unaware of their presentation. 
2. In addition, the body-state subsystem is continuously monitoring changes 
within the body. Once it has detected changes, it signals these changes to 
Implic; such a signal has similarities to what is called a somatic marker 
(Bechara and Damasio, 2004). Body-state feedback via the Implic-body loop 
may also server as a source of threat. We assume that the strength of signals in 
this loop increases with both the level of threat and state anxiety. The body-
state feedbacks are also first order threat related markers because they are 
extracted from (bodily) sensory inputs. 
3. Prop extracts meaning from the outputs of Implic. Threat-related components 
can also be interpreted further at propositional level. Then, threat related 
markers might be fedback to Implic to enhance the interpretation of 
implicational meaning. This mechanism sets up a context for comprehension 
of meaning. (Similar mechanisms may also play an important role in normal 
reading, where the meaning is continuously extracted and refined via this 
Implic-prop loop (Teasdale and Barnard, 1993). In normal reading though the 
stimuli arrive at a much slower rate than in RSVP, making it much easier for 
the context to help the reader to understand the subsequent text.) The 
propositional feedback is called a second order threat related marker.  
 
 Thus, Implic encodes an abstract schematic representation for affect using all 
three sources, i.e. threat may emerge from first order sensory inputs, body-state 
changes and second order internal thoughts.  
 The distinction between first and second order threat related markers could be 
compared with Bechara and Damasio’s (2004) notion of primary and secondary 
inducers. “Primary inducers are innate or learned stimuli, which exist in the 
environment or are learnt from experience. Secondary inducers, on the other hand, are 
generated by the recall of memories or thoughts about the primary inducers.” They 
further argued that the primary inducers could be triggered by activation of the 
amygdala, but the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for generating the 
secondary inducers. Although Bechara and Damasio have different definitions from 
us (in particular, we do not make detailed assumptions about which brain areas are 
responsible for generating these markers), it can be seen that both definitions 
distinguish two levels of threat markers by the degree of processing. In their 
definition, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for generating the 
secondary inducers. In our definition, Prop is necessary for producing second order 
threat-related markers, although it does not necessarily suggest that Prop can be 
mapped to ventromedial prefrontal cortex and Implic can be mapped to the amygdala.  
3.2 Measurement of Threat-related Information 
As in our previous model (Su et al., 2007), semantic similarity is measured using 
Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) (Landauer and Dumais, 1997) in the current model. 
Moreover, we use LSA to measure threat-relatedness, because such an approach was 
also used in Barnard’s emotional AB experiments (Barnard et al, 2005). That is, a 
word is seen as high threat if its distance to a set of generic threatening words in LSA 
space is less than a predefined threshold. Otherwise, it is seen as low threat. 
4 Cognitive Bias in Anxiety 
4.1 Hyperactive Implic-body Loop 
In our model, we assume that only high state anxious individuals produce significant 
body-state feedbacks that can interfere with attentional focus when they encounter 
highly threatening stimuli. Thus, anxiety could be modelled as a hyperactive Implic-
body loop. That is, we assume that only in the case of highly anxious individuals, the 
first order emotional markers from the visual system generate an increased activation 
at the Implic-body loop. However, such stimuli are not sufficient to trigger activation 
in the Implic-body loop in the case of low anxious individuals. Moreover, it is only 
when the stimuli are attended (i.e. being propositionally processed in our model) that 
the second order markers could be generated by Prop, and then both high and low 
anxious individuals may have increased activation in the Implic-prop loop. Such 
assumptions are supported by neurophysiological findings (fMRI, Bishop et al., 
2004), which has shown that anxiety may interact with attention to threat related 
stimuli. In their experiment, both high and low anxious people showed increased 
amygdala activation for fearful faces vs. neutral faces when the faces were attended. 
However, only high anxious people showed increased amygdala activation for fearful 
faces vs. neutral faces when the faces were unattended.  
4.2 Slow Disengament from Threat 
In our previous model (Su et al., 2007), the delay of buffer movement does not change 
systematically according to the salience level of items. (Although the buffer 
movement delay in our previous model may vary, its distribution remains the same for 
all different key-distractor and target combinations.) This is because there was no 
significant difference in the time course of the blink curves, and indeed, only blink 
depth was modulated. However, it is necessary to consider the effects of anxiety on 
the delay of buffer movement in this model, since the main effect of emotion and 
anxiety state is on the time course of the blink curves.  
A large number of studies have reported that anxious individuals may fail to or 
delay disengaging from threat-related material. For example, anxious people take 
longer to disengage their attention from threat-related facial expressions (Fox et al, 
2001; Georgiou et al, 2005) or pictures (Yiend and Mathews, 2001) compared to 
neutral or happy stimuli. However, low anxious people showed no such effect. Thus, 
for anxious individuals, we assume that the buffer, as a moving focus of attention, is 
slower at disengaging away from a subsystem if that subsystem is processing threat 
words. This is achieved by shifting the mean delay of buffer movement. We assume 
that it takes 1.3 times longer for high anxious people than low anxious people to 
switch the buffer in both directions.  
4.3 Selective Processing in Anxiety 
How we prioritise our attention to difference stimuli lies at the heart of any model of 
attention and emotion. In the context of this report, it is most important to model how 
task relevant processes compete with emotional processes. Previous work by (Wyble 
et al., 2005; Wyble et al., in press) has modelled the emotional Stroop task. In their 
model, emotional processing and cognitive processing compete through winner-take-
all inhibition. The result of such competition is emotional interference on the main 
task of colour naming. 
 Our model takes a similar approach, with the competition occurring between 
different input streams (at Implic). That is, task demand orients the model to detect 
the semantic salience of words. In this respect, high saliency would enhance task 
relevant processing, i.e. the input stream from the visual system may be more likely to 
be buffered. However, threat related markers might also attract attention, e.g. when 
anxiety enhances the activity in the Implic-body loop, generating threat-related 
markers at Implic. Consequently, the input stream from the body-state subsystem may 
be more likely to be buffered. The second order markers from Prop would have a 
similar effect as the first order markers. However, it will become clear that in the 
model, the actual interaction between task relevant (semantic) processing and 
emotional processing is more complicated, since information is passed concurrently in 
multiple streams and with feedbacks. We assume that items are processed on a first-
come-first-served basis. Moreover, when the system is committed to an item, it cannot 
process the subsequent items until it finishes processing the previous item. Thus, 
relative timing in each stream is critical for items to capture attention. 
5 Salience Assignment and Buffer Movement  
As we have explained previously, anxiety may affect the disengagement of attention. 
This is reflected by slow buffer movement for high anxious people in our model. 
Another factor that may influence the delay of buffer movement is the semantic 
salience of words. This has been supported by a number of studies. For example, 
Chun and Potter (1995) have shown that increasing the discriminability of T2 (by 
masking T2 by a symbol instead of a digit) may increase T2 performance, but 
increasing the discriminability of T1 (in the same way) may reduce the duration of the 
blink. They have argued that easily discriminating T1 could speed up the initiation of 
the second stage, and the second stage could also complete sooner. Thus, blinks will 
be shorter. A related effect has been shown by Wyble et al (2005), who have shown 
that a strong T1 results in an earlier and shorter blink, but a weak T1 results in a later 
and longer blink. Easy and hard T1s are determined by their recognition rate. Short 
blink durations may be due to the rapid recovery from the processing of a strong T1. 
We argue that salience of words may influence the blink in a similar fashion as 
the discriminability of T1 in Chun and Potter’s 2-stage model, or the strength of T1 in 
Bowman and Wyble’s STST model (Bowman and Wyble, 2007). That is, we assume 
that the buffer moves quicker when the key-distractor is high salience and slower 
when it is low salience. Such assumptions allow the model to produce a similar effect 
as that observed by (Chun and Potter, 1995; Bowman and Wyble, 2007), i.e. a short 
and earlier blink for high salience words and a long and later blink for low salience 
words. (But see also for contradictory findings: Shapiro et al., 1997.) 
The intuitions behind our assumptions are as follows: high salience words may 
be implicationally interpreted faster than low salience words, because Implic 
classifies words into different categories based on how close these words are to the 
centre of a word category. High salient words will have advantages because they are 
close to the centre, thus it takes less time to decide which category the word belongs 
to. By the same token, low salient words may take longer to be processed at Implic. 
However, Prop works differently from Implic, i.e. it maintains a collection of 
semantic referents for words. In order to assign propositional salience, Prop has to 
search for sufficient referents before a decision can be made. High salient words will 
again have advantages, because they are close to the target template and their 
semantic referents are clearly “signposted” (Barnard et al, 2005). As a result, Prop 
may take less time to decide whether a word is a target or not for the high salient 
words. However, low salient words are distant from the target template and lack ready 
semantic referents. Thus, Prop will take longer to find sufficient referents. In this 
model, we assume that the buffer moves quicker by 0.8 times in the high semantic 
salient condition than in the low semantic salient condition.  
6 Simulation Results 
6.1 Experiment 1 
This section shows how the model reproduces Experiment 1 of (Barnard et al., 2005), 
in which targets are job words, background items are nature words, and the key-
distractors can be one of three sorts:  
 
1. The same category as the background items,  
2. Neurtal words that are different category from background and target items,  
3. Physical threat words belonging to a different category from background and 
target items.  
 
 Note, in this experiment, key-distractors are not semantically related to targets, 
so they are task irrelevant. (Please refer to (Barnard et al., 2005) for detailed 
description of the experimental procedure.) The experimental results show that threat-
related words only briefly capture the attention of high state anxious individuals, at 
around lag-4, as shown in Figure 2 (b). However, Figure 2 (a&c) shows that threat-
related words do not capture attention for low anxious individuals1 when the stimuli 
are task irrelevant. 
When comparing the blink caused by emotion with the standard AB, we can 
find that the typical AB has consistent lag-1 sparing followed by a blink at lag-2, 3, 
and 4 (Raymond et al., 1992). However, the blink caused by emotion shows a 
somewhat different pattern, i.e. the blink is later (around lag-4) and narrower, as 
shown in Figure 2 (b). According to the model, the later blink may suggest that the 
physical threat words are not implicationally salient, and not being propositionally 
evaluated, as in the standard AB tasks, because the physical threat words used in this 
experiment share little semantic properties with targets. Moreover, the weakness of 
physical threat words2 without semantic relevance to the task may not be sufficient to 
capture attention as seen in the cocktail party effect. So, the model explains the later 
blink by threat markers that arrive at Implic at later stages. 
 
                                                 
1
 In this report, low anxious refers to low state anxious since trait anxiety has no effect in these 
experiments (Barnard et al., 2005). 
2
 A single exposure of a threat word is a relatively weak threat compared to, for example, one’s life 
being threatened by a gunman. 
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Figure 2 Target report accuracy by serial position in the following conditions: (a) Human - Low 
trait low state anxious; (b) Human - High trait high state anxious; (c) Human - High trait low 
state anxious; (a,b and c adapted from Barnard et al., 2005) (d) Simulation results - High and low 
state anxious, high threat related stimuli. 
 
 As we have discussed, blinks observed in the high state condition could not be 
caused by the buffer moving to Prop, because the time course would not match. So, 
we argue that the blink (if it occurs) could only be due to emotional processing 
triggered by threat related markers. In order to distinguish the sort of blink shown in 
Figure 2 (b) and other blinks, we call this type of blink an emotional blink and call the 
blink considered in the previous model a semantic blink (Su et al., 2007). As 
discussed previously, there are three sources of threat-related information. The first 
order threat markers from the visual system do not produce blinks because they do not 
cause an attention switch to other subsystems or other input streams. So, only the 
body-state feedback and the second order threat markers from Prop could produce 
emotional blinks. As previously discussed, in this experiment, words are not 
propositionally processed, so the emotional blink can only be caused by body-state 
feedback. Moreover, it is assumed that only high state anxious people produce 
significant body-state feedback for the sort of weak threatening materials considered 
here resulting in an interference with attentional focus. Hence, the simulation result 
shows that the emotional blinks can only be found in high state individuals at around 
lag-4, as shown in Figure 2 (d). The model produces such emotional blinks as follows: 
 
1. A threat related key-distractor passes from the visual system (Source) to 
Implic. 
2. Threat-related information (first order threat markers) is extracted at Implic. 
For (and only for) high state anxious people, sufficient SOM and VISC signals 
are initiated to generate body-state processing. 
3. When the changes in the body are detected by the body-state subsystem, 
feedback (containing first order threat markers) will be sent to Implic. We 
assume that such feedback occurs at around 100-120ms after the onset of the 
key-distractor and remains for no longer than 100ms. 
4. Implic detects the body-state feedback and switches the buffer from 
monitoring the visual system input stream to checking the event at the body-
state input stream. Hence, targets arriving from the visual input stream might 
be missed and emotional blinks would occur. 
5. When the buffer returns to the visual input stream after a brief check of body-
state, the blink recovers. Note, we assume that switching of the buffer within a 
single subsystem takes less time than between two different subsystems. This 
is why emotional blinks in this experiment are narrower. 
6. Less anxious people do not show blinks due to the insensitivity of the Implic-
body loop as explained previously. 
 
 In summary, when weak threat is competing with the main task, the buffer in 
less anxious individuals tends to stay at the input stream of the main task, i.e. the 
visual system. However, anxiety may enhance the Implic-body loop shifting attention 
to the input of emotional markers from the body-state subsystem. In the next 
experiment, the semantic salience of the key-distractor is increased. We can predict 
that when salience has reached a certain level, even high anxious individuals could 
overcome the emotional interference. Moreover, the extensive semantic processing 
may also introduce a second order threat marker, which may cause interference with 
the main task at a later stage via the Prop-implic loop. 
6.2 Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 in (Barnard et al., 2005) is similar to Experiment 1 explained 
previously, but it uses four types of key-distractors: 
 
• High salient high threat 
• Low salient high threat 
• High salient low threat 
• Low salient low threat 
 
 All key-distractors are human related words, thus even low salient key-
distractors may be salient enough to capture attention. So, most key-distractors would 
be both implicationally and propositionally processed and would produce normal 
semantic blinks if the emotional interference is ignored. We are interested in how 
semantic processing interacts with emotional processing over time and whether 
emotional and semantic blinks could co-occur. It has been reported that the most 
significant lateral shift of the blink curve occurs only in the high threat condition 
(Barnard et al., 2005). As shown in Figure 3 (a&c), the dynamic of attentional capture 
is a function of both anxiety states and semantic salience.  
 We argue that emotional processing and goal directed semantic (cognitive) 
processing might compete for limited attentional resources. In this setting, the goal 
directed processing might be dominant, since the key-distractors are all high salient 
human related words. Both high and low state anxious individuals would see key-
distractors as implicationally salient and process them propositionally. On detecting a 
salient key-distractor, the buffer will be committed to moving to Prop at 60ms from 
the onset of the key-distractor. Thus, from this point of time, Implic cannot respond to 
the threat feedback from body-state (if there is any) for both high and low anxious 
individuals when such feedback arrives at Implic. So, emotional blinks could not 
occur at this point.  
However, human data has shown a potential late secondary blink that might 
follow the first semantic blink, as shown in Figure 3 (a&c). We argue that in our 
model, such secondary blinks could only be caused by the threat-related feedback 
from Prop. As we have previously explained, such propositional feedback is 
generated by the slow Implic-prop loop, thus it arrives much later than body-state 
feedback, which is generated by the fast Implic-body loop. In this model, the 
propositional feedback could occur from around 400ms to 560ms after the onset of 
high-threat key-distractors. A secondary emotional blink may occur if Implic 
responds to propositional feedback, the depth of the blink is modulated by the 
probability of Implic catching such feedback, which we will discuss now. 
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Figure 3 (a) Human - high salient condition; (b) Simulation - high salient condition; (c) Human - 
low salient condition; (d) Simulation - low salient condition.  
  
We explain how the model blinks in the following four different conditions.  
 
• For the low state anxious individuals and high semantically salient key-
distractor condition, shown as a solid line in Figure 3 (a), the curve starts with 
a brief initial semantic blink. Then, it is followed by a longer second blink. As 
previously discussed, the high salient key-distractor should be processed at 
Prop, so we can identify that the second blink must be caused by the threat-
related propositional feedback. The emotional blink in this condition is more 
pronounced than in the other three conditions. The reason is that high semantic 
salience enables a rapid switch of the buffer between subsystems, as we have 
discussed in the previous sections. So, the first semantic blink is brief, and the 
buffer returns to Implic in time to capture the threat-related feedback from 
Prop. 
• For the high state anxious individuals and high semantically salient key-
distractor condition, shown as a dotted line in Figure 3 (a), the curve starts 
with a sharp and long initial semantic blink. There is a small second blink at 
later lags. This is because of the slow disengagement of attention from threat 
by highly anxious individuals, i.e. the buffer stays in Implic and Prop for a 
longer time and their first blinks are longer than those for less anxious people. 
In other words, the blink is incidentally extended by threat and high state 
anxiety. As a result, they are more likely to miss the threat-related feedback 
from Prop. So, in our model the second blink is much reduced. We can see 
that the second blink is almost invisible in the human data. We argue that such 
shallow blinks in late lags are more difficult to be discovered by the current 
experimental setup, since noise in the system increases as the lag increases. 
That is, the key-distractor initiates the blink; therefore the blink onset is 
accurately timed locked to the key-distractor. But, as time progresses from this 
time locked onset, temporal noise increases. 
• For the low state anxious people and low semantically salient key-distractor 
condition, shown as a solid line in Figure 3 (b), the curve is similar to the 
standard AB curves except that the model shows a very shallow secondary 
blink. This is because the buffer moves slightly slower for low salient key-
distractors. And, low anxious people do not generate sufficient body-state 
feedback to interfere with the on-going task. Thus, the buffer moves to Prop, 
and stays there for an extended period to evaluate the propositional meaning as 
we have explained in Section 5. Similar to the previous condition, the blink is 
incidentally extended, and propositional feedback is likely to be missed at 
Implic. Hence, such a shallow and late blink is embedded in noise and difficult 
to find in human data. 
• For the high state anxious people and low semantically salient key-distractor 
condition, shown as a dotted line in Figure 3 (b), the curve starts with a slow 
onset and long initial semantic blink. There is also no significant second blink 
at later lags. This is because of the slow disengagement of attention for highly 
anxious individuals and low semantic similarity. In this condition, the buffer 
moves much slowly than in the other three conditions. So, the model produces 
both lag-1 and lag-2 sparing. The blink also has a very long duration. The 
propositional feedback is likely to be missed in this condition, so no clear 
second blink was found up to lag-10 in both simulation and human data. 
7 Comparison between Other Theories 
There are several well-known theories that address the information processing of 
emotion and anxiety. In comparison with our model, we now consider these existing 
models, e.g. the somatic marker theory (Damasio, 1994), the Evaluative Map Network 
or EMNET (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews and Machintosh, 1998), a connectionist 
model of the emotional Stroop task (Wyble et al., in press), and neuroscience findings 
on the amygdala (Le Doux, 1996). 
The somatic marker hypothesis argues for the notions of “body loop” and “as if 
body loop”. These loops differ from each other by whether or not the body is engaged 
in the emotional processing. Our model also reflects such distinctions, i.e. the Implic-
body loop contains the body-state subsystem while the Implic-prop loop does not. In 
this respect, the threat marker from the Implic-body loop could be seen as a somatic 
marker. The threat marker from the Implic-prop loop reflects internal thought. In the 
context of this report, we stress the ability of such markers in directing attention, i.e. 
both kinds of markers could potentially cause the buffer to move away from the main 
task. Hence, the cognitive task (recalling job words) is competing with emotional 
processing for limited attentional resources. 
Another well-known theory for emotion-cognition competition is EMNET, 
which also influenced us. The main components in EMNET are a pair of competing 
modules. One is processing target relevant representations, and the other is processing 
emotional distractor representations. These two modules inhibit each other in a 
competition for limited attentional resources. Attending to targets facilitates the 
performance of the main task, but attending to distractors interferes with the main 
task. They have argued that effortful task demand could enhance the target 
representations and make it win the competition. Thus, attention is captured by target 
representations. However, anxiety may increase the tendency of automatic and 
unconscious processing of emotional meaning. Consequently, attention may also be 
captured by distractor representations. Our model extends EMNET by considering 
two levels of meaning, and attention to be distributed between them. Perhaps, the 
most significant difference between our model and EMNET is the fact that we have 
modelled richer feedbacks between body-state and two levels of meaning. As a result, 
more complex interaction would occur when stimuli and threat markers are 
synchronised by the feedback loops. Moreover, Implic-body and Implic-prop loops in 
our model have different delays. Hence, our model predicts that the relative 
competitive power between semanticly salient stimuli and emotional markers rely not 
only on their absolute strength but also their time courses. 
 Wyble et al (in press) have proposed a neural network model of the emotional 
Stroop task, in which emotional words slow the responses to subsequent neutral 
words in the next trial. This finding is consistent with our model in terms of the 
generally slowed effect of emotion. Moreover, they (Wyble et al., in press) modelled 
the competition between cognition and emotion in the form of inhibitory competition 
between cognitive and emotional parts of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Such 
an approach is also similar to our model in respect of different input streams 
competing for the buffer at Implic. 
 Regarding the time course of emotional stimuli, Le Doux (1996) has argued 
for a two-pathways model of fear conditioning. In his model, information about 
threatening stimuli (either conditioned or unconditioned) can be fed into the amygdala 
via two routes. Importantly, these two routes work at different speeds, i.e. 
 
• The “low road” is subcortical, that is, sensory inputs go through the thalamus 
and project to the amygdala directly. It was argued that this pathway is fast 
but it only supports crude representations of the stimulus. Thus, it can only 
extract representations that roughly encode which category the stimulus 
belongs to. 
• In the “high road”, sensory inputs are first processed at the thalamus, and then 
continue to sensory cortex, where a more complete analysis is performed. 
Finally, the results are fedback to the amygdala. This route is relatively slow, 
but provides more complete and sophisticated representations of the stimulus.  
 
Note, pathways described by (Le Doux, 1996) were identified from animals, 
thus whether the same pathways exist in humans remains hotly debated. Now ,we 
discuss the relationship between Le Doux’s model and our Implic-body and Implic-
prop loops. We have argued that they are consistent in handling two routes that differ 
in speeds, but there is no accurate mapping between brain areas identified in Le 
Doux’s model and our ICS model. However, neuroimaging (LaBar et al., 1998; 
Buchel et al., 1998) and studies on either amygdala or hippocampus lesion patients 
(Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995) have suggested possible neural substrates for 
such separate pathways in humans. 
8 Conclusion 
Our model reproduces the human data in Experiment 1, but the fit is not very accurate 
in Experiment 2, i.e. we only capture the general time course of the data but not the 
detailed performance. Nonetheless, the model is valuable because it allows both 
semantic and emotional processing to be expressed in a single framework, and their 
interaction to be investigated in the context of AB experiments. Although, in the 
current form, a number of assumptions made in this model are not fully justified by 
experimental findings, it remains an interesting hypothesis for the potential 
mechanism underlying the emotional AB. For example, we have assumed that the 
speed of processing for high salient stimuli is faster than that for low salient stimuli. 
However, to our knowledge, there is no direct evidence that supports such an 
assumption. The current model is based on some indirect findings (e.g. Chun and 
Potter, 1995; Wyble et al., 2005), which suggests that more visually salient T1s 
generate a reduced blink. We think a potential method to validate (or falsify) our 
assumptions is to relate our model to electrophysiological data, which may give us 
more accurate timing constraints. 
With respect to the interaction between emotion and cognition, the general 
effect of emotion on the AB has been extensively studied, but related computational 
theories of the emotional AB are not readily available in the literature. Some 
successful computational models of emotion rely on learning algorithms discovered 
by neuroscientists, e.g. reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 
1997). Others argue for competition between emotion and cognitive processing 
(Wyble et al., in press; Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews and Machintosh, 1998). Our 
model is closer to the latter, and argues for competition between cognition and 
emotion, i.e. emotional salience can attract the buffer, and thereby impairing 
(cognitive) task oriented processing. Like many other models, the distribution of 
attention also depends on the relative strength of task relavent stimuli and emotional 
interference. For example, as previously explained, when highly salient (task relevant) 
stimuli arrive at Implic, they can capture attention only if weak emotional markers are 
present from the body-state subsystem. However, our model differs from others, since 
stimuli also compete in time. This is achieved by the buffer movement dynamic. That 
is, when a weak emotional marker triggers the buffer to move, any following highly 
salient stimuli may be missed, since the buffer has been engaged to switch. In this 
respect, the interaction between cognitive and emotional processing is much richer in 
our model, allowing temporal properties of mental processes to affect the allocation of 
attention. This provides a new perspective and reevaluation of the relationship 
between cognition and emotion. 
In summary, although our model of the emotional AB only partially reproduces 
the human data (Barnard et al., 2005), it provides an initial step towards integrating 
semantic and emotional processing in a unified computational framework. We believe 
that it may be refined in the future to accurately account for emotional AB 
phenomena. 
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